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EXTENDING OUTSIDER TRADING LIABILITY 
TO THIEVES 
Adam R. Nelson*
 
 
This Note addresses the important question of whether all thieves can be 
held liable for violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Rule 10b-5.  Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has cautiously 
expanded liability for trading on material nonpublic information from 
corporate insiders only, to tippees, to outsiders standing in a fiduciary 
relationship to the source of the confidential information.  Recently, the 
Second Circuit held in SEC v. Dorozhko that a thief who owed no duty to 
the source of misappropriated information could be held liable if he 
accomplished his theft by means of affirmative misrepresentation.  This 
decision represents the next step in increasing liability for outsider trading. 
This Note contends that holding all thieves liable, even those who do not 
obtain information by means of affirmative misrepresentation, constitutes a 
logical expansion of liability consistent with section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and 
case law.  The traditional requirement of a fiduciary relationship between 
the misappropriator and the source of the information in outsider trading 
cases results in under-inclusive doctrine that fails to fully satisfy the 
purpose of the Exchange Act.  Expanding liability to include all thieves is 
sound policy that will better protect investors and the integrity of the 
market. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 13, 2011, Raj Rajaratnam, the billionaire co-founder of the 
Galleon Group hedge fund, was sentenced to eleven years in prison for 
violating federal insider trading laws.1  At Rajaratnam’s sentencing, Judge 
Richard Holwell commented, “Insider trading is an assault on the free 
markets,” and that Rajaratnam’s crimes “reflect a virus in our business 
culture that needs to be eradicated.”2  Prosecutors accused Rajaratnam of 
exploiting a network of well-placed friends and business contacts to gain 
confidential information relating to earnings reports and takeover activities 
at a number of major companies, including Google, Hilton, and Intel.3  
These tippers included a former managing director of McKinsey & 
Company, Rajat Gupta,4 and a senior vice president at IBM, Robert 
Moffat.5  In total, the government has brought charges against twenty-nine 
defendants in enforcement actions related to the Galleon investigation.6
The prosecution of Rajaratnam and the other members of his web of 
tippers indicates the seriousness with which the government pursues insider 
trading allegations and the stiff penalties imposed on those who are caught 
 
 
 1. Susan Pulliam & Chad Bray, Trader Draws Record Sentence:  Rajaratnam Slapped 
with 11-Year Prison Term for Orchestrating Insider Scheme, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2011, at 
A1. 
 2. Peter Lattman, Galleon Chief Sentenced to 11-Year Term in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/rajaratnam-
is-sentenced-to-11-years/. 
 3. See Litigation Release No. 21,284, SEC, SEC Charges 13 Additional Individuals and 
Entities in Galleon Insider Trading Case (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2009/lr21284.htm. 
 4. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Civ. 7566 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2011).  The 
complaint against Gupta alleged that he shared with Rajaratnam information obtained in the 
course of his duties as director of Goldman Sachs and Proctor & Gamble. Id. 
 5. See James Bandler, Dangerous Liaisons at IBM:  How a Star Executive’s Love 
Affair Ensnared Him in the Biggest Hedge Fund Insider-Trading Ring Ever, FORTUNE, July 
26, 2010, at 66, 68; Caroline Winter et al., The Great Hedge Fund Takedown, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 14–20, 2011, at 79, 80. 
 6. See Litigation Release No. 22,140, SEC, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against 
Rajat Gupta, Brings New Charges Against Raj Rajaratnam (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22140.htm. 
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engaging in the practice.7  For the first time in an insider trading 
investigation, the government used wiretaps to record conversations during 
which Rajaratnam and others shared information.8  The eleven-year 
sentence Rajaratnam received, though less than the maximum twenty-four 
years’ imprisonment the prosecution sought, represents the longest-ever 
sentence for insider trading.9  In addition, the district court judge presiding 
over the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) case ordered 
Rajaratnam to pay a $92.8 million penalty, the largest ever imposed in a 
SEC insider trading case.10  Combining the penalty with fines and 
forfeitures imposed at the time of his sentencing, Rajaratnam will pay a 
total of $156.6 million.11
The sentencing of Rajaratnam was an important moment in a recent push 
by federal prosecutors to pursue insider trading prosecutions aggressively.  
In the two-year period leading up to Rajaratnam’s conviction, Preet 
Bharara, the current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 
brought charges against fifty-four individuals for insider trading crimes.
 
12  
Of those, fifty have been convicted at trial or have pled guilty, while the 
matters of three others remain pending, and one is a fugitive.13
A recent study published by the Wall Street Journal indicates that 
sentences for insider trading have become longer and that those sentenced 
are more likely to spend time in prison than they had been previously.
 
14  In 
the past two years, 79 percent of those sentenced for insider trading 
violations in New York federal courts have been sent to prison, compared 
with 59 percent in the 2000s, and less than half of those sentenced from 
1993 to 1999.15  Additionally, in the past two years, the median sentence 
for defendants sent to prison for insider trading violations has risen to 2.5 
years, up from 18 months in the previous decade and 11.5 months from 
1993 to 1999.16
 
 7. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation:  The Path 
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 
1625 (1999) (noting that because insider trading is difficult to detect in many instances and 
the rewards for insider trading are potentially significant, the penalties must be stiff in order 
to provide an effective deterrent to the conduct). 
 
 8. See Susan Pulliam, Galleon Sinks, Informant Surfaces, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2009, at 
A1. 
 9. Pulliam & Bray, supra note 1.  Prior to Rajaratnam’s sentencing, the longest 
sentence for insider trading had been imposed on Zvi Goffer, another participant in the 
Galleon trading scandal. Id. 
 10. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Civ. 8811, 2011 WL 5374112, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
8, 2011); Peter Lattman, Rajaratnam Is Ordered to Pay $92.8 Million Penalty in Trading 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at B3. 
 11. See Lattman, supra note 10. 
 12. Peter Lattman, 11 Years in Jail for Fund Chief in Stock Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2011, at A1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Chad Bray & Rob Barry, Long Jail Terms on Rise, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2011, 
at C1. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
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Despite the high-profile media and prosecutorial attention insider trading 
cases enjoy, the limits of liability for insider trading and even its doctrinal 
underpinnings remain uncertain.17  Individuals such as Rajaratnam are 
liable under current insider trading law when they receive improper tips 
from company insiders, even if they are outsiders to the company about 
which they receive confidential information and in whose securities they 
trade.18  On the other hand, it is unclear under current doctrine whether an 
individual who does not receive a tip, but who steals confidential 
information from a company to which she is an outsider in order to use the 
information to make a securities trade, is liable for unlawful insider 
trading.19  This is a worrisome gap in securities laws that can be exploited 
by a number of thieves.20
This Note addresses this important issue.  Part I examines the 
background and development of insider trading liability.  It reviews the 
purpose behind the initial prohibition against insider trading as well as the 
subsequent evolution of insider and outsider trading doctrine through 
judicial decisions.  Part II examines the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of the misappropriation theory in United States v. O’Hagan,
 
21
I.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST INSIDER 
AND OUTSIDER TRADING 
 
which expanded liability for trading on material nonpublic information to 
outsiders.  Finally, Part III argues that holding all thieves liable for trading 
on stolen material nonpublic information is consistent with Supreme Court 
case law and constitutes sound public policy. 
This section provides a brief summary of the theoretical underpinning of 
the prohibition against insider trading, a review of the statutes prohibiting 
the practice, and the cases through which the doctrine developed.  Part I.A 
provides an overview of the statutory provisions and SEC rules that prohibit 
trading on material nonpublic information.  Part I.B discusses the 
scholarship supporting the prohibition against insider and outsider trading 
and the arguments that support a free market approach to confidential 
information.  Part I.C concludes with a review of the major cases through 
which the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading liability 
developed. 
 
 17. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See infra Part I.C.1.d. 
 19. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on 
Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 900–01 (2010). 
 20. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fiduciaries, Misappropriators and the Murky Outlines of 
the Den of Thieves:  A Conceptual Continuum for Analyzing United States v. O’Hagan, 33 
TULSA L.J. 163, 174 (1997) (noting that thieves, industrial spies, and nonfiduciaries may not 
be liable under Supreme Court precedent).  Cyber-theft of financial assets and sensitive 
information by company insiders and outsiders has become common, and can be difficult to 
detect and prevent. See SEC, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE:  TOPIC NO. 2 (Oct. 13, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. 
 21. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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A.  Statutory Background 
The Securities Exchange Act of 193422 provides the statutory authority 
for the federal prohibition against insider trading.23
1.  The Underlying Purpose Behind the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
  This section examines 
Congress’s purpose in passing the Act and the two sections of the Act under 
which insider trading violations are prosecuted. 
The Act provides the statutory authority for the modern prohibition 
against insider trading.24  The Act was one of many pieces of legislation 
passed by Congress in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 to 
regulate securities and securities markets in the United States.25  The Act 
regulates securities, their issuers, buyers, and sellers, as well as the 
securities marketplace, including exchanges.26
Members of Congress during the New Deal recognized the need to 
restore public confidence in investment securities, and passed the Act with 
the intention of giving the SEC broad authority to regulate in the public 
interest.
 
27  The Act’s stated purpose was “to insure the maintenance of fair 
and honest markets.”28  Congress’s underlying policy concerns in passing 
the Act were the protection of investors and the integrity of the market.29
 
 22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
  
To achieve the broad purposes intended by Congress, the Act “assure[s] 
that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or 
 23. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW:  INSIDER TRADING 23 (2d ed. 2007).  
Professor Bainbridge notes that prior to the enactment of federal securities laws, state law 
had governed insider trading cases, and though the federal laws have largely preempted state 
laws, cases are still occasionally brought under state law, and plaintiffs still sometimes 
include state laws claims along with federal insider trading claims. See id. at 7–8, 15. 
 24. Id. at 23. 
 25. See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment:  A Historical 
Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 329, 329–30 (1988).  In addition to the Act, after the stock market crash of 1929, 
Congress also passed the Securities Act of 1933, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act 
of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to regulate securities.  The purpose of New Deal financial 
regulations has been described as a project to “[m]ak[e] capitalism live up to its 
pretensions.” MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND THE NEW DEAL 3 (1970).  
Congress created the SEC in 1934, granting it the authority to administer regulations related 
to the securities laws. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 29 (6th ed. 
2009). 
 26. See HAZEN, supra note 25, at 20. 
 27. See PARRISH, supra note 25, at 3, 228; Steve Thel, The Original Conception of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 461 (1990) (noting that 
contemporaries of the Act considered it to fundamentally change the relationship between 
the public and the market). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006). 
 29. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell:  Insider Trading After United 
States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 175 (1998) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91–92 
(1975) (Conf. Rep.)). 
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advantages among investors.”30  Accordingly, it “addresses virtually all 
aspects of securities transactions and the securities markets generally.”31
Prior to passage of the Act, Congress held hearings to examine stock 
exchange practices during the period leading up to the stock market crash.
 
32  
The Senate authorized the Committee on Banking and Currency to hold 
hearings on the practice of buying and selling stocks.33  The testimony drew 
the Committee’s attention to the practice of insider trading.34  In its report, 
the Committee identified directors and officers breaching their fiduciary 
duties to aid their market transactions, as well as large shareholders 
profiting by accessing and using inside information, as “[a]mong the most 
vicious practices” uncovered by their investigation.35  As the SEC and the 
Supreme Court would both later note, “A significant purpose of the 
Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for 
personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.”36
2.  Statutory Provisions Prohibiting Insider Trading 
 
a.  Section 16(b) 
Congress acted to address the issue of insider trading in section 16 of the 
Act.37  Section 16(b) of the Act permits shareholders to sue officers, 
directors, or shareholders holding more than 10 percent of the company’s 
stock to recover any short-swing profits gained by the purchase and sale, or 
sale and purchase, of any equity security in the company occurring within 
six months of each other.38  The stated purpose of section 16(b) is to 
“prevent[] the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by 
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to 
the issuer.”39  When reviewing transactions for a violation of 16(b), the 
majority of courts interpret the transactions so as to maximize shareholders 
recovery.40
 
 30. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (quoting 
 
H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-229, at 91). 
 31. HAZEN, supra note 25, at 309. 
 32. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 25, at 338–39. 
 33. 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at Item 21 (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973). 
 34. Id. at 55. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983) (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 
SEC 907, 912 n.15 (1961)). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006). 
 38. Id. § 78p(a)–(b). 
 39. Id. § 78p(b). 
 40. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 184 (stating that courts interpret section 16(b) to 
maximize the recovery by companies); HAZEN, supra note 25, at 538–39 (noting that many 
courts take a “broad view” of what constitutes profit under section 16(b)). 
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Section 16(b) provides a limited prohibition against insider trading.41  
The benefit of section 16(b) is that it clearly defines the conduct prohibited 
and the penalty for violation.42  However, the statute prohibits only a 
limited range of conduct by insiders.43  The statute is therefore both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive.44  It may result in liability for an insider who 
commits a technical violation of the statute without abusing inside 
information, while allowing an insider to use confidential information but 
avoid liability by timing her transactions to skirt the letter of the statute.45  
Despite these limitations, for thirty years after its passage, federal courts 
addressed insider trading only through section 16(b).46
b.  Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
 
Section 16(b) is no longer the lone provision that prohibits insider 
trading.47  Many insider trading cases are now brought under section 
10(b)48 of the Act and Rule 10b-549 promulgated thereunder.50  Section 
10(b) of the Act is a general prohibition against fraud or misrepresentation 
in securities transactions.51  Under section 10(b), Congress granted 
authority to the SEC to promulgate rules “as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors.”52
In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 under the rulemaking 
authority granted to it under section 10(b).
   
53  The Rule was originally 
enacted to fill a gap created by the Act’s prohibition of fraud in the sale of 
securities, but not their purchase.54  It has since become a principal weapon 
used to fight securities fraud.55  The purpose behind Rule 10b-5 is to protect 
investors from being deceived into purchasing or selling securities.56
 
 41. See HAZEN, supra note 
 
25, at 535 (noting that Congress considered section 16(b) to 
be a “crude . . . objective” method of preventing the use of information in a situation with a 
great potential for abuse). 
 42. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 182–83. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. HAZEN, supra note 25, at 535–36. 
 46. See Painter et al., supra note 29, at 162. 
 47. See David M. Brodsky & David J. Kramer, A Critique of the Misappropriation 
Theory of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 45 (1998) (noting that “section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 have become the primary provisions for prosecuting insider trading”). 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 50. See Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 47, at 45. 
 51. See HAZEN, supra note 25, at 442. 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  The development of insider trading doctrine under section 10(b) 
is covered in greater detail in Part I.C., infra. 
 53. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 27. 
 54. See, e.g., Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”:  Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), 
Confidentiality Agreements, and the Proper Scope of Insider Trading Liability, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 1469, 1473 (2010). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See HAZEN, supra note 25, at 442. 
2012] OUTSIDER TRADING LIABILITY FOR THIEVES 2165 
Rule 10b-5 contains three specific provisions related to the purchase or 
sale of a security.  The first provision, 10b-5(a), bans the use of “any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”57  Section 10b-5(b), the second 
provision, prohibits material misstatements and omissions.58  Finally, the 
third provision, Section 10b-5(c), proscribes “any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”59
These three provisions create a broad and adaptable prohibition against 
securities fraud consistent with the flexible antifraud provision of section 
10(b) of the Act.
 
60  Taken together, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are “not 
intended as a specification of particular acts or practices that constitute 
fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices 
by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others.”61
B.  Economic Arguments Regarding the Prohibition Against Trading 
on Material Nonpublic Information 
 
Commentators have disagreed on whether insider trading harms 
investors, and have debated the desirability of the prohibition against 
insider trading.62  Though the debate is unlikely to result in a significant 
change in securities regulation, and less likely still to lead to a repeal of the 
ban on insider trading,63 the lack of scholarly consensus suggests one 
reason why courts have proceeded cautiously in developing insider trading 
jurisprudence.64
Part I.B.1 reviews the arguments made by scholars who support the 
prohibition against insider trading in order to address the fundamental 
question of whether the prohibition serves to make markets more efficient 
and fairer to traders.  Part I.B.2 then considers arguments made by scholars 
who support a free market approach to insider information.  Finally, Part 
I.B.3 concludes by reviewing a recent argument that regulation of outsider 
trading, such as trading based on inside information stolen by a corporate 
outsider, is better justified than the prohibition against trading by insiders. 
 
 
 57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2011). 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). 
 59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c). 
 60. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 29–30; HAZEN, supra note 25, at 442 (describing 
Rule 10b-5 as the SEC’s “most encompassing antifraud prohibition”). 
 61. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 911 (1961).  In keeping with the broad 
purpose of the Act, courts have interpreted the Act “flexibly rather than with narrow 
technicality.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246–47 (1980) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); 
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). 
 62. See infra Part I.B.1–2. 
 63. Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 1620 (arguing, in response to the suggestion that federal 
insider trading law be repealed and regulatory jurisdiction be returned to state common law, 
that because of the way the law of insider trading has developed it would be “too costly” to 
make a fundamental change of this kind). 
 64. See infra Part I.C. 
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1.  Arguments Supporting the Insider Trading Prohibition 
Scholars have developed a number of arguments in support of the 
prohibition against insider trading.  This section reviews four of these 
arguments.  The first two arguments discuss how insider trading reduces 
market efficiency.65  The third involves the potentially negative effect that 
insider trading would have on management of publicly traded companies 
with dispersed shareholders.66  The fourth relates to what supporters of the 
prohibition believe is a weakness in the free market approach.67
First, scholars contend that insider trading reduces investor confidence 
and thereby harms the markets.
 
68  Congress’s purpose in passing the 
securities laws was primarily to promote the integrity of the stock markets 
and the public’s confidence in the markets.69  This purpose was generally 
moral and political in nature rather than purely economic; the efficient 
pricing of securities was only a secondary purpose.70
However, an economic argument for the benefit of promoting investor 
confidence exists as well—namely, that insider trading increases transaction 
costs.
 
71  Supporters of the prohibition have argued that “[i]nvestors are 
reluctant to play in what they perceive to be a rigged game.”72  To the 
extent that investors are willing to invest in markets that they perceive to be 
rigged, they will demand compensation in the form of discounting the 
securities at the time of purchase.73  The prohibition against insider trading 
increases confidence among the investing public, which in turn promotes 
liquidity and investment and reduces the discounting demanded by 
investors because of perceived unfairness.74
Second, supporters of the prohibition argue that the ban makes markets 
more efficient because it protects the incentives for market analysts to 
perform their function.
 
75  Permitting insider trading would reduce 
incentives for market analysts to conduct research because they would not 
be able to learn all of the information on which trading in the market 
occurs.76
 
 65. See Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in 
Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 110–12 (1998). 
  The prohibition against insider trading therefore promotes the 
efficiency of markets by protecting those who gain their informational 
 66. See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting:  A Critical Response to the 
“Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 655–59. 
 67. Id. at 657–58. 
 68. See Karmel, supra note 65, at 110–12. 
 69. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 70. See Karmel, supra note 65, at 111–12. 
 71. A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan:  Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy 
for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 50 (1998). 
 72. Id. at 49. 
 73. Id. (noting that outsiders will discount shares because they will not be able to 
determine whether the public share price is accurate, but will know that they will 
systematically lose out to inside traders). 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Karmel, supra note 65, at 110–12. 
 76. Id. 
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insights by diligence and whose efforts are integral to the informational 
efficiency of the stock markets.77  One criticism of this market efficiency 
argument, however, is that it underestimates the chilling effect on 
research.78  By discouraging the use of information that has not been 
previously disclosed, a ban on insider trading reduces the incentive to create 
such information.79
Third, supporters of the prohibition contend that permitting insider 
trading by managers is not in the interest of public corporations that have a 
large number of passive owners, primarily, public shareholders.
 
80  Such 
owners will not expend their own resources to monitor and constrain 
managerial misbehavior because they can free ride on the efforts of others 
and gain the same benefits.81  Under a system that permits insider trading, 
management would control the information related to insider trading and 
shareholders would lack an effective way to monitor whether the tradeoff 
between the benefits and costs of insider trading by management was in 
their interests.82  In a system of such informational asymmetry, 
shareholders would rationally prefer unqualified openness in their 
managers’ compensation arrangement.83  The prohibition against insider 
trading stands in for the terms to which shareholders and management 
would agree should a negotiation be possible.84  One supporter of the 
prohibition has argued that permitting insider trading as a form of 
compensation would harm shareholders; it would lead managers to select 
projects that are riskier than shareholders would prefer, because managers 
would capture a share of any gain while leaving shareholders to bear any 
loss.85
Finally, supporters argue that because the prohibition is the status quo, 
those who advocate a free market approach carry the burden of persuading 
that the prohibition should be rescinded.
 
86  Critics of the ban have deployed 
empirical data in support of a free market system with respect to 
confidential information, or have argued that no data exists to support the 
prohibition.87
 
 77. Pritchard, supra note 
  Supporters counter that empirical data on the topic is scant, 
71, at 51. 
 78. See Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 353, 355 (1988). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Cox, supra note 66, at 655–56. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 657. 
 83. Id. at 657–58. 
 84. Id.  In situations in which enforcement is difficult or the costs of enforcing private 
property rights are high, the state often deploys its regulatory power as a substitute for 
granting property rights. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 1626. 
 85. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, 
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332. 
 86. See Cox, supra note 66, at 657–58. 
 87. See id. at 643–44. But see Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading:  Hayek, Virtual 
Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 174–77 (2005) (arguing that, 
because business people did not complain about insider trading before its prohibition, they 
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most likely because the topic of insider trading does not lend itself to 
empirical study, and the conditions to test management in a free market do 
not exist because of the prohibition.88  Thus, supporters insist, the critics’ 
argument that no empirical data supports the prohibition is unpersuasive 
and does not justify a radical change to the existing regulatory scheme.89
2.  Arguments in Favor of Permitting Insider Trading 
 
The work of Professor Henry Manne has animated the arguments against 
the insider trading ban.90  Manne questioned the premise of the prohibition, 
asserting that insider trading did no harm to long-term traders, and 
criticized the lack of analytical rigor on the part of the ban’s supporters.91
First, Manne argued that insider trading produces the benefit of moving 
stock prices closer to the price at which the stock would be valued if all 
information, including inside information, were known to the market.
  
He also advanced two primary arguments in favor of permitting insider 
trading. 
92  
Inside traders will begin trading on the nonpublic information after gaining 
access to it.  Uninformed traders following the price change of the stock—
or who become informed of the confidential information by means of 
leakage of the information or tipping—will gain insight and trade as well.93  
The result of these trades is to move the share price gradually toward the 
price that incorporates the confidential information, rather than for the share 
to experience a sharp price change that would be expected to occur upon 
disclosure of significant confidential information to the trading public.94  
The pricing rationale articulated by Manne has been criticized as 
inefficient95
 
did not see a problem with the practice and may well have considered it to have beneficial 
effects). 
 and, with respect to the investor who trades with the informed 
 88. See Cox, supra note 66, at 644–45 (noting that because insider trading relies on 
secrecy, researchers will always lack observable data on which to base their studies). 
 89. See id. at 645. 
 90. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); 
see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 133–35. 
 91. MANNE, supra note 90, at 10.  Manne has argued that long-term investors, defined as 
those who trade to rebalance diversified portfolios in changed circumstances or who alter 
weightings in an already balanced portfolio, would face little harm whereas short-term 
traders who treat the stock market as a “gambling casino” would frequently lose out as a 
result of insider trading. See Manne, supra note 87, at 169 & nn.7–8. 
 92. See MANNE, supra note 90, at 78–104.  Critics of the prohibition against insider 
trading generally subscribe to the efficient capital markets hypothesis. See Thomas Lee 
Hazen, Commentary, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 987, 993 (1987). 
 93. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 144–45. 
 94. See MANNE, supra note 90, at 80–83, 86–90. 
 95. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 144.  Movement of prices due to release of 
information by insider trading has been criticized as slow and, in some instances in which 
noise trading is sufficiently high, the release of information may fail to move prices at all. 
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549, 629–34 (1984). 
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trader, a poor substitute for disclosure.96  Indeed, the type of information 
likely to move stock prices is often the type that will require prompt 
disclosure.97
Second, Manne argued that permission to use inside information could be 
a beneficial and appropriate form of compensation for entrepreneurs 
working at large corporations.
 
98  He argued that neither salary nor bonuses 
were appropriate forms of compensation for an entrepreneur because, while 
the value of the entrepreneur to the firm is in creating new information, it is 
rarely possible to value such information in advance.99  However, an 
increase in stock price serves as a reasonably accurate measure of the value 
of the new information to the firm, and the entrepreneur can recover the 
invention’s value by purchasing the shares in advance of the announcement 
of the invention.100
This model has been criticized on a number of grounds.  The value 
recovered by the entrepreneur may not be accurate in that it is limited by the 
resources with which she can purchase shares.
 
101  Moreover, it is difficult 
to limit trading only to the entrepreneur and only to situations in which she 
produces valuable information, rather than bad news that will reduce share 
price.102  Finally, it is difficult to design compensation packages properly, 
given the contingent nature of insider trading.103
3.  Differential Treatment of Insider and Outsider Trading 
 
Professors Ian Ayres and Stephen Choi advanced a different approach to 
analyzing trading based on informational advantages.104  The authors 
contended that the arguments in favor of banning outsider trading are 
stronger than the arguments in favor of banning insider trading.105  This is 
because the informed outsider fails to internalize the full impact of her 
trading.106  The authors agreed with Professor Manne that a firm would be 
able to “internalize many of the costs and benefits from trades based on 
inside information on the part of its managers.”107
 
 96. Cox, supra note 
  By means of a 
contractual relationship allowing managers to trade on insider information, 
the firm is able to reduce compensation while providing management with 
66, at 646. 
 97. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 692 (3d ed. 2009). 
 98. See MANNE, supra note 90, at 131–45. 
 99. See id. at 134–36. 
 100. See id. at 138–41. 
 101. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 146. 
 102. See id. (noting that an inside trader who can profit from a company’s loss will be 
more tolerant of bad news). 
 103. See id. at 147. 
 104. See generally Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 313 (2002). 
 105. Id. at 321. 
 106. Id. at 320. 
 107. Id. at 337–38. 
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an incentive to maximize profits.108  Loss to shareholders resulting from 
managers’ insider trading will result in shareholders demanding a discount 
at the time the company sells its shares to the public.109  To the extent that 
managers adjust firm decisions in order to engage in insider trading and 
these adjustments result in an increased expected cost to shareholders, 
investors will demand a discount at the time they purchase shares.110  Thus, 
the authors concluded that a firm that allows insider trading can largely 
internalize the costs.111
In contrast, Ayres and Choi argued that the informed outsider fails to 
internalize the social impact of trading and therefore should not be 
permitted to trade on material nonpublic information.
 
112  The outside trader 
only internalizes the direct cost of obtaining the trading information and the 
benefits from the use of that information in trading, but ignores the value of 
increased price accuracy or the costs to the uninformed trader with whom 
the outside trader conducts the transaction.113  The authors stated that 
although “outsider trading without the consent of the traded firm can 
increase or decrease social welfare. . . .  as an empirical matter . . . external 
costs are likely to be more prevalent than external benefits.”114  Ayres and 
Choi argued that it is difficult for regulators to determine ex ante which 
instances of informed outside trading are socially beneficial and which are 
detrimental.  As a result, the misappropriation theory115 essentially fails in 
making such a determination because of its blanket prohibition against 
certain types of outside information advantages.116  They suggested instead 
that firms are better placed than regulators to make such a determination 
and should be permitted to do so.117
The misappropriation theory has addressed outsider trading by certain 
outsiders.
 
118  Ayres and Choi made a strong argument that it would be 
desirable to expand regulation of outsider trading beyond current limits 
because of the special concerns that relate to outsider trading.119
4.  Summary of Economic Arguments 
 
As described in the brief summary above, the extensive scholarship 
examining the economic rationale for the prohibition against insider trading 
 
 108. Id. at 338–39. 
 109. Id. at 340. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 341. 
 112. Id. at 320. 
 113. Id. at 320–21, 343 (noting that the value of the increase in the accuracy of the price 
depends on whether and when the information would have become known in the public 
capital markets without the actions of the outside trader). 
 114. Id. at 343. 
 115. See infra Part II. 
 116. See Ayres & Choi, supra note 104, at 354. 
 117. See id. at 354–55. 
 118. See infra Part II.A. 
 119. See Ayres & Choi, supra note 104, at 404–08. 
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has failed to produce a clear consensus either for its prohibition or for 
changing the regulatory landscape by removing the prohibition.  The 
scholarly commentary also has failed to settle the debate as to whether the 
prohibition against insider trading succeeds in accomplishing the Act’s 
purpose of ensuring the integrity of markets (or whether a different 
regulatory scheme, or no scheme at all) would be more effective.120
C.  Evolution of Insider Trading Doctrine via Judicial Decisions 
  Given 
the uncertainty of the theory underpinning the prohibition, it is unsurprising 
that courts have acted carefully in developing the doctrine of the prohibition 
against insider trading. 
Neither the text of section 10(b) nor the text of Rule 10b-5 mentions 
insider or outsider trading.121  As noted above, the scholarly debate 
surrounding the prohibition against insider and outsider trading has also 
failed to provide clear support for the theoretical underpinnings of the 
prohibition.  The initial question, therefore, is whether insider or outsider 
trading constitutes fraud or deceit prohibited under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.122  In the absence of explicit direction from Congress, and with 
encouragement from the SEC, courts have developed insider and outsider 
trading doctrine via judicial decisions.123
Courts recognize two theories of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 for trading on material nonpublic information.  The first is the 
classical theory of insider trading.  The second, not accepted by the 
  Through a series of cases, courts 
have used the general anti-fraud provisions of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
to develop the modern prohibition against insider and outsider trading that 
extends beyond the limited prohibition described in 16(b).   
 
 120. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 121. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 122. See Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 576 (2008). 
 123. Because of the complexity of the jurisprudence and the stiff penalties assigned to 
those found liable for insider trading, many commentators have encouraged congressional 
action to provide greater clarity to the prohibition. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 19, at 913–
14; Krawiec, supra note 20, at 175.  Congress has in the past considered legislation to 
provide a firm definition of insider trading, but in each instance chose not to take action. See 
Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 1315, 1366–68 (2009) [hereinafter Nagy, Insider Trading].  Recently, however, 
Congress passed legislation to clarify that insider trading by congressional insiders is 
prohibited. See Robert Pear, Insider Trading Ban for Lawmakers Clears Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/insider-trading-ban-
for-lawmakers-clears-congress.html.  Increased congressional support for the Stop Trading 
on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act was prompted by an exposé on the television 
program 60 Minutes. See Carl Hulse, A Change in Attitude About Dubious Stock Dealings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2011, at A17.  The STOCK Act was originally proposed in 2006 but 
found little support, and had been criticized for failing to reach certain behavior. See Donna 
M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1105, 1130–37 (2011) (noting that the STOCK Act failed to reach certain hypothetical 
situations, and failed to deal with obstacles that the SEC would face in investigating 
members of Congress and staffers). 
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Supreme Court until 1997, is the misappropriation theory.  The remainder 
of Part I discusses the major cases by which these theories have developed 
before reviewing two recent enforcement actions by the SEC that test the 
limits of currently accepted doctrine. 
1.  Classical Theory 
a.  In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 
The classical theory of insider trading liability was first articulated in the 
SEC proceeding In re Cady, Roberts & Co.124  During a break in a meeting 
of the directors of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, J. Cheever Cowdin, a 
Curtiss-Wright director, called Robert M. Gintel, one of his partners in the 
brokerage firm Cady, Roberts & Co., and told him that the board of Curtiss-
Wright had decided to approve a dividend cut.125  Before the cut was 
announced publicly, Gintel sold shares from customer accounts, thereby 
avoiding substantial losses when the Curtiss-Wright share price dropped 
significantly.126
In holding Gintel liable for violating Rule 10b-5, Chairman William Cary 
articulated the “disclose or abstain” standard of insider trading liability.
 
127  
An insider of a company must disclose material information known to her 
by virtue of her position with the company but not known to her trading 
partner if knowledge of such information would affect the investment 
decision of the trading partner.128  Failure by the insider to disclose the 
material information in such a situation constitutes fraud.129  If disclosure 
of the material information is not possible or unrealistic under the 
circumstances, then the insider must abstain from making the 
transaction.130  In Cady, Roberts, the board’s decision to reduce the 
dividend constituted material information and, because of his relationship to 
Curtiss-Wright as one of its directors, Cowdin was not permitted to trade on 
that information without disclosure.131  The prohibition extended to Gintel 
as well, since he was a partner of Cady, Roberts & Co. with Cowdin.132
b.  SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
 
Because Cady, Roberts was an SEC administrative decision, and 
therefore did not constitute binding precedent for the federal courts, there 
was some question how the courts would treat the duty to disclose or 
 
 124. 40 SEC 907 (1961). 
 125. Id. at 909. 
 126. Id. at 909–10. 
 127. Id. at 911. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 912. 
 132. Id.  The case was also one of first impression in that the trades in question occurred 
over an impersonal exchange rather than face-to-face. Id. at 907. 
2012] OUTSIDER TRADING LIABILITY FOR THIEVES 2173 
abstain.133  However, the Second Circuit took up the issue of insider trading 
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 several years later, in the case 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.134  On November 12, 1963, a team of 
employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (TGS) took geological core samples 
from a location near Timmons, Ontario that revealed significant copper, 
zinc, and silver content.135  Because of the significance of the initial 
sample, TGS was convinced of the benefit of acquiring the entirety of the 
geological segment from which the sample was removed.136  To facilitate 
the acquisition, the president of TGS ordered the members of the team that 
took the sample to keep the results of the sample confidential, even from 
other TGS officers, directors, and employees.137
In March and April of 1964, TGS engaged in further drilling at the site 
and confirmed a significant mineralogical discovery.
 
138  Meanwhile, the 
company denied rumors and reports that it had made a major find, going so 
far as to run a report in general circulation newspapers on April 13, 1964 
giving a misleading statement on the find at Timmons.139  Shortly 
thereafter, the company made an official announcement of the find on April 
16, 1964, after a journalist who visited the site prepared to publish an article 
describing a major find at Timmons.140
During the period between the extraction of the initial sample and the 
announcement of the find, certain TGS insiders bought TGS shares and 
options in TGS stock and tipped outsiders as to the significant discovery 
made at Timmons.
 
141  Two defendants bought TGS shares in the period 
between the April 13 press report and the official announcement of the 
discovery on April 16.142  Also, in February 1964, TGS issued stock 
options to twenty-six officers and employees, four of whom were aware of 
the detailed results of the core sample and another of whom was aware of 
the discovery of a positive sample.143  Because of confidentiality concerns, 
neither the TGS Stock Option Committee nor the Board of Directors had 
been informed of the discovery, and the insiders with knowledge of the find 
accepted the options without disclosing their knowledge.144
On review, the Second Circuit endorsed the disclose or abstain theory, 
holding that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 applied to the insiders’ trading 
activity.
 
145
 
 133. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 
  The court cited Cady, Roberts for the proposition that one who 
has access to information intended solely for a corporate purpose, and not 
23, at 42. 
 134. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 135. Id. at 843. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 844. 
 139. Id. at 845–46. 
 140. Id. at 846–47. 
 141. Id. at 844, 847. 
 142. Id. at 847. 
 143. Id. at 844. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 847–48. 
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for the personal benefit of anyone, may not use the information if she 
knows it is unavailable to the person with whom she trades.146  The Second 
Circuit noted that the prohibition was not limited to insiders, but that 
“anyone” in possession of material nonpublic information must “disclose it 
to the investing public, or, if she is disabled from disclosing it . . . or she 
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the 
securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.”147  
In this case, TGS’s legitimate corporate purpose of maintaining the 
confidentiality of the find at Timmons did not excuse the insiders’ 
disclosure requirement; consequently, their trading without disclosure was 
not permissible.148
The Second Circuit stated that the disclose or abstain theory “is based in 
policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all 
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to 
material information,”
 
149 known as “parity of information.”150  In the 
court’s view, simple possession was sufficient to trigger the disclose or 
abstain rule, because the requirement extends to “anyone” who has access 
to information “directly or indirectly.”151
Thus, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the court endorsed a broad theory of insider 
trading liability based on the disclose or abstain theory, extending it to 
anyone in possession of material nonpublic information.   
 
c.  Chiarella v. United States 
When the Supreme Court subsequently addressed insider trading in 
Chiarella v. United States,152 it did not endorse the same broad liability that 
the Second Circuit had adopted in Texas Gulf Sulphur.153  Vincent F. 
Chiarella was a markup man for Pandick Press, a financial printer that 
produced announcements of takeover bids.154  To preserve confidentiality, 
when Pandick received bid announcements, they contained blanks or false 
names in the place of the names of the companies involved in the 
transaction.155  The real names of the participating companies were not 
given to Pandick until shortly before the documents were to be printed.156
 
 146. Id. at 848 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961)). 
  
Despite this precaution, in five instances Chiarella was able to identify the 
companies involved in the transactions using other information contained in 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 153. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 44 (noting that the insider trading holding of the 
case, based on the parity of access theory, is no longer good law). 
 154. Id. at 224. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
2012] OUTSIDER TRADING LIABILITY FOR THIEVES 2175 
the redacted documents.157  And despite company policy and clear 
warnings against doing so, Chiarella traded on this information, making 
over $30,000 in fourteen months.158  He was convicted at trial of seventeen 
counts of violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.159  The Second Circuit 
affirmed.160
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella’s convictions.
 
161  Chiarella was 
convicted under the theory that he had remained silent and willfully failed 
to inform sellers of the securities he purchased that he had information 
regarding planned takeover bids that would increase the value of the 
companies’ shares.162  In reversing, the Court held that one who does not 
disclose material information prior to engaging in a securities transaction 
commits fraud only when she has a duty to disclose that information, and a 
duty to disclose arises only when there is “a fiduciary or other similar 
relation of trust and confidence” between the two parties.163  Because no 
relationship existed between Chiarella and the sellers that gave rise to a 
duty to disclose, the Court overturned his conviction.164
The Court refused to hold that a general duty to forego trading on 
material nonpublic information exists between all market participants, i.e., 
that mere possession of material nonpublic information gives rise to a duty 
to disclose or abstain.
 
165  The Court thereby rejected the parity of 
information theory on which the Second Circuit had based its holding in 
Texas Gulf Sulphur and, in doing so, narrowed the scope of liability for 
insider trading.166
Chiarella included concurring opinions by Justices John Paul Stevens 
and William J. Brennan.  Justice Stevens’s concurrence emphasized that the 
Court did not reach the live question of whether Chiarella breached a duty 
of silence owed to his employer and its customers, which would have 
resulted in an actionable Rule 10b-5 claim.
 
167  Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence suggested that if the jury had been instructed on section 10(b) 
liability arising from Chiarella’s improperly obtaining and converting 
nonpublic information used for trading (as opposed to the mere failure to 
disclose), the result may have been different, but the jury was not instructed 
that misappropriation was an element of the offense.168
 
 157. Id. at 224, 245. 
  In Justice 
Brennan’s view, a violation of section 10(b) occurs “whenever [a person] 
improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information 
 158. Id. at 224. 
 159. Id. at 225. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 237. 
 162. Id. at 226. 
 163. Id. at 228. 
 164. Id. at 232. 
 165. Id. at 234–35. 
 166. See Krawiec, supra note 20, at 169. 
 167. Chiarella, 445 U.S at 237–38 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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which she then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.”169
In addition, Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun 
authored vigorous dissenting opinions.  Chief Justice Burger interpreted 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to require that “a person who has 
misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that 
information or to refrain from trading.”
 
170  Under Justice Burger’s reading, 
the statute and rule do not limit liability to corporate insiders who make 
deceptive use of corporate information, but apply more broadly to any 
instance in which an individual accrues informational advantages by 
unlawful means.171  In his view, Chiarella should have been held liable 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he stole nonpublic information 
entrusted to him in confidence, regardless of his relationship to any other 
party.172
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, criticized the 
Court’s imposition of limitations that unduly narrowed the scope of section 
10(b).
 
173  In Justice Blackmun’s view, the majority did not justify by 
statutory text or legislative history the requirement that a fiduciary or 
similar relationship is required to give rise to a duty to disclose or 
abstain.174  The purpose of the Act, he asserted, is to ensure fairness in the 
markets broadly, not to follow the law of fiduciary duty.175  Justice 
Blackmun therefore focused on the importance of the insider gaining access 
to confidential information that an honest investor would not be able to 
obtain.176  He would have imposed a prohibition against trading by persons 
who have access to confidential material information not lawfully available 
to others.177
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Chiarella indicate 
dissatisfaction with the limitations of the classical theory as adopted by the 
Court.  The four concurring and dissenting opinions criticized the theory of 
liability accepted by the majority as unduly narrow, or expressed 
willingness to consider a broader theory of liability in the event that such an 
alternative theory was presented to the Court.  Nevertheless, in Chiarella, 
the Court affirmed the classical theory of insider trading that locates the 
prohibition within section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Failure to disclose or 
abstain by one with a duty to speak constitutes fraud, and fraud falls within 
the statutory and regulatory prohibition.
 
178
 
 169. Id. 
 
 170. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 241–42. 
 172. Id. at 245. 
 173. Id. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. at 246–47. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 248. 
 177. Id. at 251. 
 178. Steinbuch, supra note 122, at 576. 
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d.  Dirks v. SEC 
The next major case in the development of the classical theory of insider 
trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was Dirks v. SEC.179  
Raymond L. Dirks, an officer of a New York broker-dealer, received 
confidential information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity 
Funding of America (Equity), that the assets of Equity were significantly 
overstated due to fraudulent practices.180  Secrist passed the information to 
Dirks so that Dirks could verify and disclose the fraud.181  Neither Dirks 
nor his firm owned Equity stock.182  After satisfying himself that the fraud 
allegations were true, but before disclosing the fraud, Dirks openly 
discussed the fraud with a number of clients and investors, some of whom 
sold their Equity securities.183
The question on review by the Supreme Court was whether Dirks could 
be held liable for insider trading as a “tippee” under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.  The Court held that a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the 
tipper has breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholders by sharing the 
information with the tippee, and the tippee knows or should know that the 
tipper has committed a breach.
 
184  The tippee’s liability is therefore 
derivative of the tipper’s.185  Because the securities laws seek to eliminate 
the use of material nonpublic information for personal gain, the breach of 
the duty owed to shareholders occurs when the insider-tipper directly or 
indirectly profits from the disclosure.186  Therefore, the Court held that 
Dirks was not liable because neither Secrist nor the other Equity employees 
violated a duty to shareholders by profiting from disclosing the fraud to 
Dirks.187
As in Chiarella, Justice Blackmun authored a dissent, which Justices 
Brennan and Marshall joined, criticizing the majority for unduly limiting 
the scope of protection afforded by the securities laws.
 
188  By creating the 
subjective limitation on breach by tying it to the insider’s gain, the majority 
permitted Secrist to disseminate information to Dirks’s clients who sold 
Equity’s securities, and thereby harm the purchasers to whom Secrist had a 
duty to disclose.189  The dissent argued that the improper purpose 
requirement was without basis in law.190
 
 179. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 
 180. Id. at 648–49. 
 181. Id. at 649. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 660. 
 185. Id. at 659. 
 186. Id. at 662–63. 
 187. Id. at 666–67. 
 188. Id. at 667–79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 670–71. 
 190. Id. at 676. 
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Dirks confirmed that when a corporate outsider receives an improper tip 
from an insider, the outsider might be held liable for insider trading.191  
Though liability depends on the breach by the insider, the decision 
nevertheless represented an important increase in the scope of insider 
trading liability.192
e.  Summary of the Classical Theory of Insider Trading 
 
The Court’s adoption of the classical theory of insider trading liability 
under section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 holds that an insider commits 
fraud unless she discloses material nonpublic information on which she 
trades or abstains from trading.193  This duty extends to outsiders who 
receive tips of material nonpublic information from insiders if the insiders 
benefit from the disclosure to the tippee.194  Despite consistent criticism by 
a minority of the Court, the classical theory does not impose a general duty 
upon all market participants in possession of information, as originally 
articulated by Chairman Cary in Cady, Roberts, but only upon those with a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders and their tippees.195
2.  The Misappropriation Theory 
 
The origin of the misappropriation theory is commonly traced to Chief 
Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion in Chiarella.196  At that time, the Court 
had reserved judgment with respect to misappropriation because the theory 
was not presented.197  Nevertheless, in his dissent, Chief Justice Burger had 
emphasized that a person who misappropriates confidential information has 
a duty to disclose.198  Implicit in this view is the notion that liability can 
extend beyond insiders to a much broader group of outsiders.  After 
Chiarella, the SEC worked to persuade the lower courts to accept the 
misappropriation theory based on the opening in that decision.199
 
 191. See supra notes 
 
183–85 and accompanying text. 
 192. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 54–57. 
 193. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 164, 186 and accompanying text. 
 196. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 99; supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. 
 199. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 99–100.  A circuit split developed with respect to 
acceptance of the misappropriation theory.  The Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
accepted the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); 
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 
1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).  The Fourth and Eighth 
Circuits rejected the theory. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), 
rev’d, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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a.  Carpenter v. United States 
The first Supreme Court case to address the misappropriation theory was 
Carpenter v. United States.200  R. Foster Winans, the author of the popular 
“Heard on the Street” column in the Wall Street Journal, breached a duty of 
confidentiality to his employer by sharing the contents of the column with 
fellow conspirators before its publication.201  Under company policy, the 
contents of the column were not to be released before publication and, if 
they were, Winans was to disclose the release to the Journal.202  Because 
the content of the column was known to affect the price of the featured 
stocks, the conspirators were able to profit by examining the information 
contained in forthcoming columns and buying or selling stocks in 
anticipation of the column’s effect.203
In its decision, the Court emphasized that Winans had deprived the 
Journal of its property right in its confidential business information—
namely, the contents and timing of the column.
 
204  Therefore, the Journal 
was the victim of Winans’s fraud, although it neither bought nor sold 
stocks.205  The scheme satisfied the requirement that it be “in connection 
with” the purchase or sale of a security because the sole purpose of the 
scheme was to profit by using the advance information contained in the 
column.206  Nevertheless, a divided Court affirmed Winans’s conviction 
4-4,207 and thus did not create binding precedent.208
b.  United States v. O’Hagan 
 
The Supreme Court first accepted the misappropriation theory in United 
States v. O’Hagan.209  James O’Hagan was a partner at the law firm Dorsey 
& Whitney.210  O’Hagan learned that his firm had been retained as local 
counsel to represent Grand Metropolitan in connection with a potential 
tender offer for Pillsbury’s stock.211
 
 200. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
  O’Hagan purchased a number of call 
 201. Id. at 23. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 25–26. 
 205. Id. at 24. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. A decision by an evenly divided Court serves to affirm the lower court’s decision but 
does not create precedent. See Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 113 (1868). 
 209. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 210. Id. at 647.  The charges brought against O’Hagan shocked the Minneapolis business 
community, in which O’Hagan was an “acknowledged star,” responsible for defending 
important local institutions such as the Mayo Clinic. See Eben Shapiro, A Leading Lawyer’s 
Fall Is a Jolt to Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at A33.  However, O’Hagan was 
caught misusing client funds and prosecutors believed that he engaged in the trades at least 
in part to repay the funds. David Phelps, High Court to Decide O’Hagan Case, STAR TRIB., 
Apr. 14, 1997, at D1. 
 211. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. 
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options for Pillsbury stock, and 5,000 shares of Pillsbury common stock, at 
$39 per share.212  When Grand Metropolitan announced its tender offer, the 
stock value increased to nearly $60 per share.213  O’Hagan sold his options 
and shares, realizing a profit of more than $4.3 million.214
In its decision, the Court adopted the misappropriation theory, holding 
that O’Hagan’s actions satisfied section 10(b)’s requirement of a “deceptive 
device or contrivance” used “in connection with” the purchase or sale of 
securities.
 
215  Rather than premising liability on a fiduciary relationship 
between the company insider and shareholders with whom he trades, as in a 
case of insider trading under the classical theory, the Court premised 
O’Hagan’s liability on his relationship to his firm, which had entrusted him 
with the confidential information.216  The Court stated that O’Hagan owed 
a “duty of trust and confidence” to his firm and to its client, which he 
breached by trading on nonpublic information regarding the planned tender 
offer.217
In the Court’s view, O’Hagan committed the deception essential to a 
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he feigned loyalty to his 
firm and its client while secretly converting the confidential information for 
his own gain.
 
218  In so doing, O’Hagan defrauded the source of the 
information.219  The Court noted that O’Hagan would not have been liable 
under the misappropriation theory had he disclosed his intention to trade on 
the nonpublic information to his firm.220
The Court determined that O’Hagan’s actions also satisfied the 
requirement that they be “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”
 
221  The Court held that the fraud was consummated not when the 
O’Hagan acquired the information, but when he used the information to 
trade without first making a disclosure to his firm.222  Because material 
nonpublic information of the type at issue in O’Hagan is “ordinarily” used 
for the purpose of making securities trades, misappropriation of the 
information was sufficiently related to the subsequent securities transaction 
to satisfy section 10(b)’s “in connection with” requirement.223
The Court emphasized that the misappropriation theory is consistent with 
the purpose of the Act to ensure honest markets and promote investor 
confidence.
 
224
 
 212. Id. at 647–48. 
  The Court expressed the view that permitting unchecked use 
 213. Id. at 648. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 653. 
 216. Id. at 652. 
 217. Id. at 653. 
 218. Id. at 653–54. 
 219. Id. at 654–55. 
 220. Id. at 655.  The Court noted that even after disclosure, the trader could be liable in 
some instances under state law for breach of the duty of loyalty. Id. 
 221. Id. at 655–56. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 656–58. 
 224. Id. at 658. 
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of misappropriated information would permit certain individuals to gain an 
informational advantage that other parties could not overcome through 
research, and would cause investors to either refuse to participate in the 
market, or discount securities.225
c.  SEC v. Zandford 
 
In SEC v. Zandford,226 the Court reversed dismissal of section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 charges against Charles Zandford, a securities broker who made 
trades using a client’s account and, on twenty-five separate occasions, 
transferred the proceeds of the trades into his own account.227  Zandford 
argued that the securities sales were lawful and the subsequent thefts of the 
proceeds, though fraudulent, were not “in connection with” the sale.228  He 
contended that the theft was analogous to simple theft of cash or 
securities.229
The Supreme Court held that Zandford had engaged in a single scheme to 
defraud his client and each sale of securities was made to further that 
scheme.
 
230  In reaching its decision, the Court noted Congress’s purpose in 
passing the Act to ensure honest markets and protect investors, and 
emphasized the tradition of construing the securities laws flexibly.231  In 
addition, the Court granted deference to the SEC’s broad interpretation of 
the “in connection with” requirement, which the Court considered 
reasonable.232
3.  Recent SEC Enforcement Actions 
 
The Court’s acceptance of the misappropriation theory in O’Hagan 
expanded the scope of individuals who could be held liable for violating the 
prohibition against insider trading.  Recently, the SEC has brought actions 
against investors who misappropriated confidential information but did not 
stand in any relationship to the source of the information, as O’Hagan had 
to his firm and its client.233  The individuals in the cases highlighted below 
were strangers to the companies about which they gained material 
nonpublic information and in whose securities they traded; nevertheless, the 
SEC brought enforcement actions against each of them.234
 
 225. Id. at 658–59. 
 
 226. 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 227. Id. at 815–16. 
 228. Id. at 820. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 820–21. 
 231. Id. at 819. 
 232. Id. at 819–20. 
 233. See Lisa Rachlin, Recent Developments in the Duty Requirement Under the 
Misappropriation Theory:  A Critique of Cuban’s Unintended Consequences, 11 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 67, 79–81 (2010). 
 234. See id. 
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a.  SEC v. Stummer 
In SEC v. Stummer,235 the SEC charged Michael A. Stummer with 
insider trading in violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.236  Stummer 
snuck into his brother-in-law’s home office, gained access to his computer 
by guessing his password, then gained access to the network of the private 
equity firm at which his brother-in-law was employed.237  He read 
confidential emails that indicated a planned transaction and then traded 
using that information.238
Stummer consented to an entry of judgment without admitting or denying 
the SEC allegations and agreed to disgorgement of illegal profits and 
interest, as well as a civil penalty.
 
239  As a result of the consent agreement, 
the case was not tried,240 but is nevertheless noteworthy because Stummer 
bore no fiduciary relationship to his brother-in-law or to the companies 
involved in the transaction or their shareholders.241  Yet the SEC was 
willing to bring section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 charges against him and 
succeeded in obtaining a favorable settlement.242
b.  SEC v. Dorozhko 
 
In SEC v. Dorozhko,243 the SEC brought charges against a computer 
hacker who accessed confidential information.244  In October 2007, 
Oleksandr Dorozhko, a resident and national of the Ukraine, opened an 
online trading account with Interactive Brokers and deposited $42,500 into 
the account.245  Also during October 2007, IMS Health, Inc. announced that 
it would release its third quarter earnings report during a conference call 
with analysts after the market closed on October 17.246  IMS hired 
Thomsen Financial, Inc. to provide web-hosting services, including the 
online release of the earnings report.247  Throughout the day on October 17, 
a hacker repeatedly attempted to gain access to the IMS earnings report on 
the Thomsen server, eventually succeeding in locating and downloading the 
report at 2:15 PM, shortly after it was uploaded to the server.248
 
 235. Litigation Release No. 20,529, SEC, SEC Files Settled Illegal Trading Charges 
Against Day Trader who Traded on Information He Fraudulently Obtained from His 
Brother-in-Law (Apr. 17, 2008), 
 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20529.htm. 
 236. See id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. 
 241. See Rachlin, supra note 233, at 80–81. 
 242. See id.; see also Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1343. 
 243. 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 244. See id. 
 245. Id. at 44. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
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Though the IP address of the hacker was known, it had not been traced at 
the time the SEC sought a preliminary injunction from the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York.249  Nevertheless, substantial 
circumstantial evidence indicated Dorozhko’s involvement with the 
hacking.  Shortly after the hacker downloaded the report from the Thomsen 
server, Dorozhko purchased $41,670.90 worth of put options using his 
online trading account.250  Later that afternoon, IMS announced that its 
quarterly earnings were 28 percent below expectations.251  The next 
morning, IMS shares fell approximately 28 percent almost immediately 
upon the opening of trading.252  Within minutes of the market opening, 
Dorozhko sold all his IMS options, realizing a profit of $286,456.59.253
After learning about the irregular trading activity from Interactive 
Brokers, the SEC sought a preliminary injunction in the district court to 
freeze the proceeds of Dorozhko’s sale of his put options.
 
254  The district 
court denied the motion on the ground that the SEC was unlikely to succeed 
on the merits of its section 10(b) claim.255  The court rejected the SEC’s 
arguments that the hack was “theft by deception” and therefore “deceptive” 
within the term’s meaning under section 10(b).256  The court reviewed 
Chiarella and O’Hagan, and determined that in both cases, liability for 
insider trading was premised on a fiduciary or similar duty to disclose or 
abstain.257
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying 
the preliminary injunction.
 
258  In reaching its decision, the court rejected the 
district court’s reading of the relevant Supreme Court precedent that 
“deceptive” requires the breach of a fiduciary duty in all cases.259  The 
court engaged in its own reading of Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Zandford and 
concluded that the cases “all stand for the proposition that nondisclosure in 
breach of a fiduciary duty satisfies §10(b)’s requirement . . . [of] a deceptive 
device or contrivance.”260  However, the SEC’s theory was not that 
Dorozhko remained silent when he had a duty to disclose or abstain from 
trading, but rather that he affirmatively misrepresented himself in order to 
gain access to the nonpublic information he used to make his trades.261
 
 249. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated by SEC v. 
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009). 
  The 
court refused to extend the fiduciary duty requirement to the 
misappropriation context, writing that “what is sufficient is not always what 
 250. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 44. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 322. 
 255. See id. at 343. 
 256. Id. at 329–30. 
 257. See id. at 330. 
 258. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51. 
 259. See id. at 48. 
 260. Id. at 49. 
 261. See id.  
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is necessary, and none of the Supreme Court opinions considered by the 
District Court require a fiduciary relationship as an element of an 
actionable securities claim under Section 10(b).”262  The court adopted the 
interpretation of Chiarella and its progeny proposed by the SEC, namely 
that “misrepresentations are fraudulent, but . . . silence is fraudulent only if 
there is a duty to disclose.”263
After distinguishing this case based on the theory of liability, the court 
then had to determine the definition of “deceptive” that applied in cases 
where the theory of liability is affirmative misrepresentation.  The court 
held that Dorozhko could be found liable if his conduct was deceptive 
according to the ordinary meaning of the word.
 
264  The court defined 
“deceptive” broadly by relying on a dictionary definition rather than 
choosing a limited definition that would “complicate the enforcement of 
Section 10(b).”265  The court remanded the case to the district court for 
determination of whether the hacker gained access to the file by 
misrepresenting his identity or by exploiting computer code, i.e., whether 
the hack was deceptive or not.266
II.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY 
FOR OUTSIDER TRADING DOCTRINE 
 
The Court’s acceptance of the misappropriation theory in O’Hagan 
marked an important expansion of liability for trading on material 
nonpublic information to corporate outsiders.  Part II reviews the 
implications of the O’Hagan decision and the Court’s acceptance of the 
misappropriation theory for outsider trading doctrine.  Part II.A assesses the 
impact of the decision in expanding liability to a broader group of outsiders 
who had not previously been liable under classical insider trading doctrine.  
Parts II.B and II.C discuss scholarly criticism of the O’Hagan decision and 
address doctrinal tensions resulting from the decision.  Next, Part II.D 
examines how courts and the SEC have treated the fiduciary requirement 
after O’Hagan.  Finally, Part II.E asks whether holding persons who steal 
confidential information and trade using that information liable under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is a justified progression of insider trading 
doctrine after O’Hagan. 
 
 262. See id.  
 263. See id. at 50. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Id. at 49. 
 266. See id. at 51.  Subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision, the attorney for 
Dorozhko lost contact with his client. See Insider Trading:  Enforcers Turn Corner on 
Insider Trading by Hedge Funds, Say Current, Ex-SEC Staff, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 42, at 519 (Mar. 22, 2010).  The SEC subsequently brought a motion for summary 
judgment, which the attorney for Dorozhko did not oppose. Id.  The motion was granted by 
the district court on March 24, 2010. Litigation Release No. 21,465, SEC, SEC Obtains 
Summary Judgment Against Computer Hacker for Insider Trading (Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21465.htm.  Because the case was concluded 
by summary judgment, the district court did not have the opportunity to address the 
important questions raised by the Second Circuit in its decision. 
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A.  Expansion of Liability to Outsiders 
Whether a corporate outsider who did not improperly receive a tip from a 
corporate insider was forbidden from trading on material nonpublic 
information had been an open question prior to the O’Hagan decision.267  
In decisions prior to O’Hagan, the Court had only directly addressed the 
liability of company insiders and those whom they improperly tipped for 
violating the insider trading prohibition.268  By definition, such individuals 
were few in number and relatively easy to identify because of their special 
relationship to the company.269  In the context of insider trading liability, 
the fiduciary requirement provided a logical, bright-line boundary for 
defendants who could be liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.270  
Insiders’ duty not to trade was understood to be connected with their role in 
the corporation and their concomitant fiduciary duty.271  The prohibition 
against their trading was plainly consistent with the legislative history of the 
Act, and with the purpose of preventing insiders from using confidential 
information for personal gain.272
In O’Hagan, the Court explicitly stated that the misappropriation theory 
complemented the classical theory, and was intended to target outsiders 
without a fiduciary duty to shareholders of the company in whose securities 
they traded.
 
273  These outsiders represented a group who had not previously 
faced liability.274  By holding O’Hagan liable for violating section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, the Court confirmed that a broader and more diverse group 
of corporate outsiders could be held liable for insider trading.275
B.  Criticism of O’Hagan 
 
O’Hagan presented an easy fact pattern in the sense that O’Hagan had a 
fiduciary duty to his firm as a partner, and violation of a fiduciary duty was 
an accepted ground for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability under earlier 
classical theory insider trading cases.276  As a result, the SEC focused on 
the fiduciary relationship as the basis of O’Hagan’s liability.277  Professor 
Donna Nagy has argued that misappropriation is a broad and flexible 
doctrine and by considering only the fiduciary theory of liability, the 
O’Hagan decision left unexplored other theories, thereby potentially 
leaving undefined the full extent of insider trading liability.278
 
 267. See Painter et al., supra note 
 
29, at 155. 
 268. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 269. See Hazen, supra note 19, at 890–91. 
 270. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1335–36. 
 271. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1336; supra Parts I.A.1, I.C.1. 
 273. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997). 
 274. See id. 
 275. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1336. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. 
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The O’Hagan decision received criticism on a number of grounds.279  
Most relevant to the question of whether thieves can be liable under the 
misappropriation theory is criticism related to the decision’s requirement of 
a fiduciary duty owed by the misappropriator to the source of the 
information.280  The Court’s description of O’Hagan’s duty to his firm was 
criticized both for failing (1) to articulate clearly the relationship between 
the fiduciary duty requirement and the harm caused by misappropriation, 
and (2) to provide clear guidance as to which outsiders could face liability 
for outsider trading.281
1. The O’Hagan Decision Did Not Fully Analyze 
the Fiduciary Relationship 
 
The O’Hagan decision has been criticized for its failure to provide a full 
and satisfactory analysis of the fiduciary duty underlying O’Hagan’s 
liability for misappropriating information from his firm.  Scholars have 
noted that the Court appeared to limit the relationship to a fiduciary one, 
rather than a relationship of “trust and confidence” used elsewhere, but 
these scholars have expressed uncertainty with respect to whether the Court 
intended to establish a new, more limited standard.282  Professor Kimberly 
Krawiec has noted that although the Court refers repeatedly to a “fiduciary 
relationship,” it failed to define the term.283  The decision left unclear 
whether the fiduciary duty that the Court conceived as underpinning the 
misappropriation theory comes from state or federal law.284  To the extent 
the Court addressed the characteristics of the fiduciary duty, it merely 
emphasized the traditional qualities of the duty:  trust, loyalty, and 
confidentiality.285
The O’Hagan Court recognized a safe harbor provision for a fiduciary 
who discloses to the source of the information her intent to trade.
 
286
 
 279. See Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the 
Supreme Court:  A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 867 (2003) (noting that the decision was criticized for 
“misconstruing the relevant statute; misreading the Supreme Court’s own precedents; 
lacking a coherent doctrinal basis for prohibiting insider trading; leaving too many 
unanswered questions; creating illogical loopholes in the regulatory scheme; and extending 
the reach of federal securities laws too far”). 
  This 
provision of the case has been criticized as indicative of the Court’s 
 280. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1339–40. 
 281. See Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 1634. 
 282. See Painter et al., supra note 29, at 176–77. 
 283. Krawiec, supra note 20, at 174. 
 284. See Painter et al., supra note 29, at 176, 206 (noting that federal courts will have to 
develop their own common law if the Court intended a federal law of fiduciary duty to 
apply—and if state law fiduciary principles govern, then different results could occur in 
different states in instances of similar fact patterns). 
 285. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1339. 
 286. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). 
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inconsistent application of the fiduciary requirement.287  Such a provision 
does not make sense as a matter of fiduciary law, but the Court deemed the 
carve-out necessary because it treated O’Hagan’s silence to his firm as the 
deceptive conduct that brought his actions within section 10(b) of the 
Act.288
2.  The O’Hagan Decision Failed to Articulate the Relationship 
Between the Misappropriation Theory and a Fiduciary Relationship 
 
The Court in O’Hagan was clear that it premised O’Hagan’s liability on 
a breach of duty owed to his firm.289  It held O’Hagan liable because he had 
feigned fidelity to the source of the information, which constituted the 
deception essential to a finding of liability under the misappropriation 
theory.290  In requiring the fiduciary relationship, the Court carried over to 
the misappropriation theory the fiduciary framework that controlled liability 
under the classical theory.291  However, the O’Hagan Court failed to 
articulate why liability under the misappropriation theory should be limited 
to those who breach a duty to the source of the information, and failed to 
state why O’Hagan’s “feigning fidelity” to his firm was essential to 
satisfying the deception requirement.292  It is uncertain why the duty to 
disclose should arise from a fiduciary duty rather than from an obligation to 
disclose under federal securities law.293
Requiring a breach of duty between the misappropriator and the source of 
the information is unrelated to the purpose of the prohibition:  to protect 
investors and the integrity of the market.
 
294  It may be that the Court simply 
endorsed the government’s articulation of the theory, which was consistent 
with the facts of the case.295  Though O’Hagan’s feigned fidelity was 
deceptive, it is not clear why this should be a prerequisite for an outsider’s 
liability under the misappropriation theory.296
3.  Failure to Define Liable Outsiders 
 
After the Chiarella decision in 1980, lower courts articulated various 
conceptions of the misappropriation theory, each with slightly different 
 
 287. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1339.  The First Circuit treated the 
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 288. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1339. 
 289. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–55. 
 290. Id. at 655. 
 291. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1336. 
 292. See id. 
 293. See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under 
Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1655–56 (2004). 
 294. See Krawiec, supra note 20, at 174. 
 295. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654, 665 n.6; see Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 1638 (noting the 
repeated approving references in the majority opinion to the government’s brief). 
 296. See Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 123, at 1335.  For example, the 
misappropriation theory, as articulated by Chief Justice Burger in his Chiarella dissent, is 
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standards, which resulted in vague doctrine.297  Professor Richard Painter 
and his colleagues noted that the O’Hagan Court failed to clarify 
misappropriation doctrine by providing criteria by which a lower court 
could distinguish between a fiduciary relationship and a non-fiduciary 
relationship.298  This vagueness is compounded by the incoherence of 
requiring a fiduciary relationship between the misappropriator and the 
source when the purpose is to protect the market and investors.299  Thus, 
they argued after O’Hagan that lower courts will still need to engage in an 
essentially ad hoc analysis whenever presented with a relationship between 
the source and the misappropriator that has not been addressed in a previous 
case.300
The Court’s treatment of the fiduciary requirement in O’Hagan led some 
commentators to read the decision as standing for the proposition that the 
misappropriation theory does not require the breach of a fiduciary duty at 
all.
 
301  The purpose of the misappropriation theory does not require a 
fiduciary relationship.302  As explained by Justice Blackmun in his 
Chiarella dissent, the misappropriation theory is intended to apply to 
anyone who misappropriates information and is not necessarily limited to 
individuals with a fiduciary duty to the source.303
C.  A Fiduciary Requirement Results in the Misappropriation Theory 
Being Under-Inclusive 
  Thus, reading O’Hagan 
for the proposition that a fiduciary duty is not required for liability—
interpreting the decision as a broader prohibition against theft—is 
consistent with the underlying purpose of the misappropriation theory. 
Critics have posited that limiting liability under the misappropriation 
theory to cases in which the trader breaches a fiduciary duty to the source of 
the information is under-inclusive.304  This result occurs because the market 
and investors are harmed similarly by anyone who trades on material 
nonpublic information, but only certain outsiders will be liable under the 
misappropriation theory.305  Likewise, to the extent that a company has a 
property interest in its confidential business information, as the Court stated 
in Carpenter,306 that company is harmed by a misappropriator using the 
information to make securities trades regardless of whether the trader was a 
fiduciary of the company.307
 
 297. See Painter et al., supra note 
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 300. See id. at 191. 
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D.  Post-O’Hagan Treatment of the Fiduciary Requirement 
In the aftermath of the O’Hagan decision, the SEC promulgated Rule 
10b5-2.308  Rule 10b5-2 enumerates a non-exhaustive list of circumstances 
that give rise to a duty of “trust or confidence.”309  The purpose of the rule 
was to clarify the relationships that could give rise to a duty of trust and 
confidence.310  These circumstances include (1) any time a person agrees to 
maintain information in confidence,311 (2) when parties exchange 
information and a past pattern of sharing confidence exists between the 
parties such that the recipient knows or should know that the person 
communicating expects her to maintain the information as confidential,312 
and (3) when family members exchange information and the receiving party 
is unable to show that the person sharing the information did not expect that 
she would keep the information confidential.313
The relationships listed in Rule 10b5-2 have not traditionally been 
considered fiduciary or fiduciary-like.
 
314  An agreement to keep 
information confidential has not traditionally given rise to a fiduciary duty 
absent something more.315  Thus, under Rule 10b-5, a “duty of trust or 
confidence” is not synonymous with a fiduciary duty.316  One commentator 
has posited that the promulgation of 10b5-2 confirms that the 
misappropriation theory is “not about fiduciary relationships at all” but 
rather “it is about regulating information dissemination in securities 
markets, and the animating principle is one of equal access.”317
Court decisions and SEC enforcement actions in the wake of O’Hagan 
indicate that the question whether a fiduciary duty is required for liability 
under the misappropriation theory remains open.  As described above, the 
SEC has brought enforcement actions under the misappropriation theory 
against a hacker who lacked any relationship with the source of the 
information, and against an individual for accessing his brother-in-law’s 
computer after guessing his password.
 
318  In both cases, the SEC targeted 
individuals who lacked any fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty to the sources of 
information.319
The Second Circuit supported this reading in Dorozhko by holding that a 
fiduciary duty is not always required for a claim under section 10(b) of the 
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Act.320  The Second Circuit’s holding that Supreme Court precedent does 
not require a fiduciary duty in all section 10(b) cases is not universally 
accepted.  For example, the district court in Dorozhko had held that a 
fiduciary duty was required.321  Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held in Regents 
of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc.322 
that a breach of candid disclosure is an essential element of a deceptive 
device under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  A number of scholars have 
likewise argued that a fiduciary duty is a requirement for any violation of 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and have criticized the Dorozhko decision for 
its departure from that requirement.323  Nevertheless, the SEC appears, by 
virtue of its recent enforcement actions, and Rule 10b5-2’s promulgation, to 
be pushing its position that a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation need 
not occur only when there is a breach of a fiduciary duty and, at least in 
Dorozhko, the Second Circuit agreed.324
E.  The Duty Not to Steal 
 
Though the debate remains open, if the SEC and Second Circuit are 
correct, and a fiduciary duty is not a requirement for all section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 violations, an important limitation on outsider trading liability 
will be removed.  This would, in turn, suggest that the alternative reading of 
O’Hagan—that he violated a duty not to steal confidential information and 
was liable for violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 regardless of his 
relationship with his firm—is correct.325
III.  THEFT BY AN OUTSIDER IS SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER 
OUTSIDER TRADING LIABILITY 
  This reading places emphasis on 
the acquisition and dissemination of the information into the market. 
The question remains open whether a theft of information is sufficient to 
trigger a duty for an outsider to disclose or abstain from trading.326  Some 
scholars have read the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Hagan as not 
requiring a fiduciary relationship for misappropriation theory liability.327
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Under this reading, the Court articulated a duty not to steal material 
nonpublic information, rather than a duty not to misappropriate information 
only in the presence of a fiduciary duty owed by the misappropriator to the 
source of the information.328
Part III of this Note asserts that all thieves of material nonpublic 
information should be held liable under the misappropriation theory in light 
of Supreme Court precedent, recent case law, and public policy consistent 
with the purpose of the Act.  Part III.A reviews Supreme Court precedent 
related to insider and outsider trading and argues that extension of liability 
to outsiders is consistent with the Court’s treatment of insider and outsider 
trading doctrine.  Part III.B addresses the affirmative misrepresentation 
theory of outsider trading liability accepted by the Second Circuit in 
Dorozhko, and concludes that the framework is under-inclusive.  Part III.C 
argues that holding all thieves liable for outsider trading is consistent with 
both the purpose and letter of the Act and with Supreme Court case law.  
Finally, Part III.D argues the Court should adopt a broader conception of 
the misappropriation theory, consistent with that articulated by Chief 
Justice Burger in his Chiarella dissent. 
  Until courts have the opportunity to weigh in 
definitively on a case that presents the issue squarely, or Congress produces 
clear guidance on the issue, the answer will remain uncertain. 
A.  Extension of Liability to Outsiders 
1.  Holding Outsiders Liable Is a Natural Extension of Case Law 
The history of judicial decisions related to insider and outsider trading 
liability reveals a clear trend of courts increasing the scope of liability over 
time.329  Under Texas Gulf Sulphur, all insiders trading on confidential 
information were liable for insider trading under the parity of information 
theory.330  In Chiarella, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of liability 
articulated by the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur by requiring a 
fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence to exist between the 
trading parties to give rise to insider trading liability.331  However, after the 
step back in Chiarella, the Court again expanded liability in Dirks by 
holding that tippees could be held liable for insider trading through the 
tipper’s fiduciary relationship to stockholders, even if the tippee did not 
have a fiduciary or similar relationship to the stockholders.332  Finally, in 
O’Hagan, the Court accepted the misappropriation theory, holding that 
even as an outsider, O’Hagan could be liable for trading on material 
nonpublic information, though the Court limited liability to outsiders who 
have a duty to the source of the information.333
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The trend of increasing liability for insider and outsider trading indicated 
in the case history suggests that the courts have not yet defined conclusively 
the bounds of liability.  The Court has proven flexible in its decisions in 
order to address new behavior as it has been presented.  This is in part 
because of the unclear theoretical underpinnings of insider trading 
doctrine,334 but it is also consistent with the tradition of courts interpreting 
the securities laws flexibly rather than narrowly or technically in order to 
serve their broad purpose.335
Holding all thieves liable is a logical extension of existing section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 doctrine as courts have developed it in the cases above.  
Through those decisions, the Court has extended liability from insiders, to 
outsiders who receive tips from insiders, to outsiders who owe a duty to the 
source of the information.  The extension of liability to thieves will require 
the Court to disclaim a fiduciary duty as a prerequisite in all insider and 
outsider trading cases, as the Second Circuit held in Dorozhko.
  Should the Court be presented with the 
question of liability for a thief under the misappropriation theory, the 
Court’s prior decisions are unlikely to limit its expansion of the doctrine. 
336
It is uncertain whether a fiduciary duty is required in all section 10(b) 
cases.
 
337  Recent cases, beginning with O’Hagan, and SEC enforcement 
actions indicate that the fiduciary requirement is no longer a prerequisite for 
outsider trading liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.338
Regardless of the current state of the fiduciary requirement in section 
10(b) cases, a strong argument exists that liability for outsider trading 
should not be premised on a fiduciary duty between the thief and the source 
of the information.  As noted above, scholars criticized O’Hagan for 
premising O’Hagan’s liability on his fiduciary relationship to the source of 
the information.
  The 
fiduciary requirement had served a sorting function for insider trading 
cases, separating those with a fiduciary or like relationship who could be 
held liable for insider trading from those without such a relationship who 
could not.  If scholars are correct, and the misappropriation theory under 
O’Hagan does not require a fiduciary relationship but simply prohibits theft 
of material nonpublic information, then thieves are liable under the 
misappropriation theory. 
339
Theft by a fiduciary and theft by a non-fiduciary are both undesirable and 
worthy of punishment, although for different reasons.  Some have argued 
that a theft by a fiduciary is worse than theft by a non-fiduciary because the 
  Even if O’Hagan should be read for the proposition 
that the misappropriation theory requires the breach of a fiduciary duty to 
the source of the information in all cases, the Court should do away with the 
fiduciary requirement because it is unrelated to the harm of theft which the 
misappropriation theory addresses. 
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fiduciary violates a trust, whereas a non-fiduciary thief does not.340  Other 
commentators have argued that theft by a non-fiduciary is worse because 
the non-fiduciary thief both gains and uses information unlawfully, whereas 
the fiduciary thief gains the information lawfully but then uses it 
unlawfully.341  Companies entrust material nonpublic information to 
fiduciaries in order to function.  The ability of fiduciaries to abuse their 
position therefore makes strong enforcement desirable.  On the other hand, 
theft by a non-fiduciary can be accomplished easily in many cases and the 
effects of such thefts can be serious and difficult to detect.342  This suggests 
that a non-deceptive theft should be punished strongly in order to deter 
others from engaging in theft of confidential information.  The ability of the 
SEC to obtain treble damages under securities laws has the potential to act 
as a strong deterrent.343
2.  Limiting Harm from Theft by Outsiders 
 
The purpose of the misappropriation theory, as stated by Justice 
Blackmun, is to protect against theft and improper use of material 
nonpublic information, not to deter a specific instance of a fiduciary 
violation.344  In turn, this goal is consistent with the broad goal of the Act to 
protect investors and the integrity of the markets.345
B.  The Second Circuit’s Deceptive, Non-deceptive Framework 
  Should the Court 
accept a broader conception of the misappropriation theory that does not 
rely on a fiduciary relationship, then the goal of the doctrine should be to 
limit, to the extent possible, the harm to markets, investors, and companies 
caused by outsiders who steal and trade on material nonpublic information.  
The purpose of the misappropriation theory and the goal of limiting harm 
caused by theft can be achieved only incompletely by limiting liability 
under the misappropriation theory to those who stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to the source of the information, because most thieves will not 
be in such a relation to the source of the information.  Thus, a broader scope 
of liability will better achieve the purpose of limiting the harm from theft. 
1.  Deceptive Thieves Are Liable 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Dorozhko represents an important step 
toward broadening the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability to 
capture a wider range of outsiders and to limit the harm caused by theft.346
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requirement in all section 10(b) cases.347  By accepting the theory of 
affirmative misrepresentation in Dorozhko, the court appeared to recognize 
the harm caused by trading on misappropriated material nonpublic 
information, even when the misappropriator is a thief without a fiduciary 
relationship to the source of the information.348
2.  The Deceptive, Non-deceptive Framework Is Under-Inclusive 
 
Notwithstanding this important step, the deceptive, non-deceptive 
framework is not a fully satisfactory extension of liability to outsiders.  The 
framework results in liability turning on a technical distinction that will be 
uncertain in many cases, and fails to sufficiently limit the harm caused by 
theft of information by outsiders. 
a.  The Difficulty Distinguishing Deceptive and Non-deceptive Theft 
In Dorozhko, the Second Circuit extended liability under section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 for outsider trading to non-fiduciary thieves.349  It did so by 
holding that a deceptive theft could lead to liability under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.350  However, the court remanded the case for determination 
whether the hack was deceptive because it was accomplished by means of 
an affirmative misrepresentation, or whether it was “mere theft.”351
In practice, distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive thefts 
can be difficult.
  
Although the court’s analysis indicated that deceptive conduct is sufficient 
for liability under section 10(b), it did not reach the question whether 
Dorozhko would have been liable should the district court have determined 
that the hack was not deceptive under section 10b and Rule 10b-5. 
352  For example, an outsider could commit a deceptive theft 
by disguising herself in order to gain access to an office and then stealing 
material nonpublic information from a company once inside.  This 
individual’s conduct is analytically similar to the deceptive hacker who 
affirmatively misrepresents her identity in order to gain access to a 
computer system.353  However, an outsider could also be in a company’s 
office for a legitimate purpose and steal information while there.  Such an 
individual does not accomplish the theft of information by means of an 
affirmative misrepresentation.  The individual is similar to the non-
deceptive hacker who exploits a vulnerability or loophole in computer code 
to gain access to the company’s computer system and steal information.354
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the second has not, as the distinction is made in Dorozhko.355  The first is 
liable under section 10(b) under the Second Circuit’s analysis in Dorozhko, 
whereas the second individual is not.356
Though the example above serves to make clear the distinction between 
deceptive and non-deceptive theft, the facts of Dorozhko demonstrate how 
difficult the distinction can be to make in practice.
 
357
The distinction between deceptive and non-deceptive theft may implicate 
the steps that the company will take following the theft.  For example, a 
non-deceptive theft such as the exploitation of faulty code by an anonymous 
hacker may have the positive result of providing an incentive to close such 
security loopholes.  In either case, however, the result is the violation of the 
company’s property right in its confidential information and harm to 
investors and the market.  Therefore, it is desirable that both types of theft 
be punished. 
  Dorozhko turned on a 
technical distinction, and imposing liability for securities fraud on the 
distinction is uncertain. 
b. Distinguishing Deceptive and Non-deceptive Theft Is Inconsistent 
with the Act and Case Law 
The broad purposes of the Act are to ensure the integrity of the securities 
markets and to protect investors.358  The deceptive, non-deceptive 
framework is problematic not only because the distinction between the two 
is difficult to make but also because the non-deceptive thief may not be 
liable; the framework is potentially under-inclusive and therefore fails to 
advance the purpose of the Act satisfactorily.  As indicated in the Second 
Circuit’s decision, a thief may be able to escape liability depending on a 
technical determination of the manner by which she gained access to the 
confidential information.359
It is an anomalous result that a thief should be able to shield herself from 
liability to the SEC or receive a lesser punishment based on the means by 
which she accomplished her theft.  In either case the harm is the same to the 
thief’s trading partners, the market, and the source of the information.
 
360  
Having liability turn on the distinction appears to be in conflict with goal of 
flexible interpretation of securities laws.361
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C.  Holding Non-deceptive Thieves Liable for Outsider Trading Is 
Consistent with the Act and Current Case Law 
Policy favors holding all thieves liable for stealing and trading using 
material nonpublic information.  To restrict theft to cases accomplished by 
means of deception is to engage in line-drawing that results in under-
inclusive doctrine.  This section argues that holding all thieves liable for 
outsider trading is consistent with the Act. 
As discussed above, trading by corporate outsiders presents different 
problems and creates greater externalities than insider trading.362  Thus, as 
Stephens and Choi argued, the case for regulating outsider trading is 
stronger than the case for regulating insider trading.363
Permitting the use of stolen information undermines the integrity of the 
securities markets and investors’ confidence.  The hypothetical described 
above
  Given the 
aggressive stance taken by regulators with respect to insider trading and the 
potential for greater harm by outsiders, outsider trading is likely under-
regulated in comparison with insider trading with respect to the goal of 
protecting markets and investors. 
364
As noted above, theft of information by hackers is a growing concern to 
regulators.
 distinguished between deceptive and non-deceptive thieves, but 
ultimately it is beneficial to investors, the markets, and the source of the 
information to hold both individuals liable. 
365  The facts of Dorozhko demonstrate the harm caused by such 
thieves who trade on material nonpublic information.  By using 
misappropriated information obtained by hacking the server, Dorozhko was 
able to trade with unwitting market participants using an unfair 
advantage.366
In Carpenter, the Court recognized that a company has a property 
interest in its confidential business information.
  A trading partner is harmed similarly in this instance as in 
the instance of a corporate insider trading using material nonpublic 
information; in either case, she is trading at an informational disadvantage 
to the misappropriator.  Regardless of the means by which Dorozhko 
accomplished the theft, it is consistent with the Act to hold him liable. 
367
In the absence of the breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the 
information and in the absence of an affirmative misrepresentation, the 
actions of a thief nevertheless fit within the existing framework of section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability.  Rule 10b5-2 provides “a non-exclusive 
  A thief violates this 
property right by wrongfully taking possession of the company’s 
confidential information in order to trade.  Again, regardless of whether the 
theft was deceptive or non-deceptive, the harm is similar and it is consistent 
with the Act to hold the thief liable in either case. 
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definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or 
confidence for purposes of the ‘misappropriation’ theory.”368  As noted 
above, the Rule indicates that the misappropriation theory is not concerned 
with fiduciary relationships so much as with regulating the flow of 
information in securities markets.369
D.  Chief Justice Burger’s Dissenting Opinion in Chiarella Provides a 
Broader Construction of the Misappropriation Theory 
  Theft of information used for 
securities trading, regardless of the circumstances by which the theft is 
accomplished, implicates this concern because the thief gains an unfair 
informational advantage over her trading partners. 
The view of the misappropriation theory articulated by Chief Justice 
Burger in his Chiarella dissent provides a model for the broader view of the 
misappropriation theory that courts should adopt.370  The purpose of the 
misappropriation theory, as articulated by Chief Justice Burger, is 
preventing trading on misappropriated information when the 
misappropriator gains the information by unlawful means, regardless of any 
relationship with the source.371  Under this view, the misappropriation 
theory imposes a general duty to disclose or abstain on any thief.372  This 
prohibition fits within the language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which 
reach “any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme.”373
Chief Justice Burger’s view of the misappropriation theory is broad 
enough to capture all undesirable conduct, including theft of material 
nonpublic information, without unduly chilling legitimate research.  
However, the broader liability will not go so far as to usher in a return of 
the equal access theory that was rejected in Chiarella.
  This conception 
of the misappropriation theory has the practical benefit of capturing thieves 
who are neither fiduciaries, nor engage in affirmative misrepresentation to 
accomplish their thefts, and therefore does away with two criteria that serve 
to make the misappropriation theory under-inclusive. 
374  The duty to 
disclose or abstain would arise from the unlawful acquisition of the 
information, not simply the possession of information unknown to the 
market and other investors.  Premising the duty to disclose or abstain on the 
theft of information would merely prevent thieves from using information 
that others cannot gain by lawful means.375
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CONCLUSION 
Over time, the Court has expanded liability for trading on material 
nonpublic information from corporate insiders only, to tippees, to outsiders 
such as O’Hagan, standing in a fiduciary relationship to the source of the 
confidential information.  Holding thieves liable for insider trading is the 
next logical step in the development of the misappropriation theory of 
liability under section 10(b).  The purpose of section 10(b) of the Act and 
Rule 10b-5 is to ensure the integrity of the securities markets and fairness to 
investors.  Holding thieves liable, as Dorozhko clearly demonstrates, is 
necessary to achieve that goal, but requiring a fiduciary relationship 
between the thief and the source of the information is inconsistent with this 
purpose and results in under-inclusive doctrine.  Thus, the Court should 
adopt Chief Justice Burger’s view of the misappropriation theory articulated 
in his Chiarella dissent, under which the duty to disclose or abstain from 
trading extends to all those who steal confidential information. 
 
